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ACRONYMS 
 
AICMA Integrated Mine Action Programme (of the OAS) MCA Multi-Criteria Analysis 
APL Anti-personnel Landmine MRE Mine Risk Education 
APMBC Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
AXO Abandoned Explosive Ordinance NMAA National Mine Action Authority 
BAC Battle Area Clearance NSA Non-State Actor 
CL Community Liaison OAS Organisation for American States 
CSP Country Strategy Paper PADCA Program of Demining Assistance to Central 
America (of the OAS) 
EC European Commission,  
also European Community 
PAICMA Presidential Programme of Integrated Action against 
Anti-personnel landmines (of Colombia) 
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid 
Department 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
EOD Explosive Ordinance Disposal PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
ERW Explosive Remnants of War RELEX External (Foreign) Relations Directorate General of 
the EC 
EuropeAid The EuropeAid Cooperation Office of the European 
Commission 
RIM Resilience-Impact Matrix 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining 
SHA Suspected Hazardous Area 
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmine SOP Standing Operating Procedure 
IDP Internally Displaced Persons UN United Nations 
IED Improvised Explosive Device UNDP United Nations Development Program 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
LIS Landmine Impact Survey UXO Unexploded Ordinance 
MAC Mine Action Centre   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
The EC Anti-Personnel Landmine Regulation of 20011 mandated evaluations of EC Mine Action 
strategy every three years. The first report was a Global Evaluation published in 2005, this report 
forms one part of the 2008 evaluation by regions and covers Latin America, 2002-2007. 
 
Total EC funding for mine action in Latin America in the period 2002-2007 was about 8 million 
euros, roughly 2% of the EC total worldwide budget for mine action.  Sixty-eight percent of the 
eight million euros was from the dedicated thematic Anti-Personnel Landmine budget line and 
31% was from the geographic budget for Colombia.  There were also smaller contributions from 
the Human Rights and ECHO budgets. 
 
The approach used for the evaluation was desk research, visits to mine-affected countries and 
further contact with EC delegations by phone and internet.  Face-to-face discussions with 
RELEX staff in Brussels took place before and after the field visit to Peru and Colombia. 
IMPACT OF MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
Latin America has nine countries with contamination by mines and other Explosive Remnants of 
War.  Five have no known casualties and little or no mine impact.  Three countries have local 
impact near contaminated areas and some casualties, fewer than 30 civilians per year in total, 
killed and injured, for all three countries together.  Mines account for about one third of the 
accidents.  Colombia has massive, widespread contamination affecting 60% of municipalities and 
one of the highest mine/ERW accident rates in the world, affecting about 350 civilians per year.  
Mines are still being emplaced in some parts of Colombia due to an ongoing long-term conflict.  
 
Mine clearance throughout Latin America is usually a monopoly of military and police special 
forces, there appears to be no NGO or commercial clearance.  The Organization of American 
States’ mine action programme dominates mine action both in terms of scale, and also 
historically as it started in 1991, some six years before the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) was signed.  The modus operandi is based on military-to-military training to build 
national clearance capacity based on national military (or special police forces) in each country. 
 
The EC has funded mine clearance projects (which included training and equipping, and also 
small amounts of other activities) in Chile, on the Peru-Ecuador border and in Nicaragua.  In 
Colombia funding was given for capacity building of the national mine action centre, Mine Risk 
Education, and other activities.  The Chile and Peru-Ecuador projects were perhaps selected for 
their strategic political importance more than for the impact of the demining. 
 
In 2006 a restructuring of EU foreign policy mechanisms led to the elimination of thematic 
budget lines and the introduction of four new Instruments.  Funding for mine action, except in 
countries with crises or emerging crises, would henceforth all be from geographic budget lines 
and would thus depend on the prioritisation of mine action by the national government leading to 
                                                    
1  Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, concerning action against anti-
personnel landmines in developing countries, and Regulation (EC) No 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries.  Together these are known as “the 
Anti-personnel Landmine Regulation”. 
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its inclusion in the EC Country Strategy Paper.  This is in line with the EC commitment to the 
Paris Declaration. 
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The selection of countries to receive funding was appropriate and relevant.  The allocation of 
funding was also generally relevant.  More attention could have been given earlier to the mine 
contamination inside Peru blocking access to infrastructure. 
 
Whilst the funding for mine clearance may indeed have been an entirely appropriate response to 
political goals, with two exceptions there is no longer an evident need for further mine action 
funding in Latin America.   The most important exception is Colombia, a heavily mine impacted 
country with hundreds of mine casualties every year, and there may also be a case for some 
limited support for the special police demining teams clearing infrastructure in Peru. 
   
The OAS mine action programme has offered the EC very poor value for money in terms of the 
cost of demining.  There are also some serious issues regarding how the OAS way of working 
relates to a Project Cycle and developmental approach.  Any future EC investment in mine action 
in Latin America must take more steps to conduct an appraisal to determine the appropriate 
program model and the value for money of the proposed intervention.   
 
There are problems with fragmentation and isolation of the EC mine action efforts and the staff 
responsible for implementing them.  These were noted in the 2005 Global report but have been 
exacerbated in some ways by deconcentration, the ending of the APL horizontal budget line and 
other impacts of the new Instruments.  Latin America is particularly susceptible to this due to the 
small number of projects – one per selected country except Colombia.   
 
There has not been enough communication between EC staff working on mine action throughout 
Latin America – due to the small number of mine action projects Project Officers do not usually 
have colleagues with mine action experience in the same delegation.  Exchange of information 
and experience between delegations could have been of real value – especially in a region where 
many mined areas are on international borders and all the affected countries have a common 
language. 
 
EC staff has only one, or a few, mine action projects as part of a large portfolio; they are not 
specialized in demining.  This has led to poor project design and implementation.     
 
There is a lack of information in a suitable format to support delegation staff by providing them 
the key information they need to successfully draw up and implement demining contracts and 
manage mine action projects.  The lack of information is exacerbated by the apparent difficulty in 
contracting technical experts to assist in these tasks (a key point of the 2005 Global Assessment) 
and the absence of opportunities for specialist training. 
 
Whilst there are some difficulties in coming to grips with the new Instruments, especially for 
rapid response actions, these are not specific to mine action.  The mine action community was 
apparently unaware of the changes in advance, despite their publication from 2004 onwards.   
 
In Colombia the ongoing conflict, and the military monopoly on demining, limit options.  The EC 
funding for a rapid survey of landmine impact and victims (currently in planning) is welcomed.  
Until a peace process is underway there may be limited opportunities for further action.  The 
work already supported in building institutional capacity in Colombia appears to be sustainable 
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beyond the end of the funding and further support in this area is not a priority. 
Mine action in support of the EC’s substantial commitment to peace-building and emergency 
relief to displaced people in Colombia should remain a priority within the CSP for Colombia so 
that funding from Geographical budget lines remains an option. 
 
In November 2008, after this report was written, the EC published a set of guidelines on how to 
more effectively link mine action with development for future programming of EC mine action 
over the 2008-2013 period.  This Commission Staff working document, “Guidelines on European 
Community Mine Action 2008-2013” can be downloaded from the website.2 
 
 
                                                    
2 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/anti_landmines/docs/index_en.htm  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted a Regulation3 in two parts 
as the basis of the European Community response to the problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines 
(APL). The Regulation laid the foundation of a Europe-wide integrated and focused policy.  
 
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states: “The Commission shall regularly assess 
operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the 
operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future 
operations.” The APL Regulation goes on to state: “Every three years after entry into force of this 
Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all 
Community mine actions […]” (Article 14). 
 
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-20074 further 
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the 
results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment. 
 
To implement these provisions, the EC: 
Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004; 
Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned 
within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:5 
 
Africa Caucasus-Central Asia Latin America 
Asia-Pacific Europe Middle East 
 
The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,6 while the agreement with 
the GICHD was concluded in December that year.  
 
The objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and 
means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, 
programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the 
Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the 
Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country and 
                                                    
3 Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against 
anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third 
countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are nearly identical.  The two 
regulations are collectively known as “The APL regulation” (singular). 
4 This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first 
covered the period 2002-04.  
5 Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:  
• provide a repository service for reports from evaluations and similar studies; 
• train people from mine affected countries in evaluation; 
• support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine 
Ban Treaty (MBT). 
6 Gasser, Russell and Keeley, Robert, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004. 
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regional levels. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of 
individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical 
programming issues.  
 
OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION 
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Latin America to 
generate credible and useful lessons for the European Commission, to support the improved 
planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies. 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
1. To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis: 
• the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-
2007; 
• national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities; 
• EC Country Strategy Papers and National Programmes for mine-affected countries in 
Latin America; 
2. To analyse the allocation of funds among mine-affected states in Latin America, and across 
the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.); 
3. To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in: 
• addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries 
• fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities; 
• supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the 
beneficiary countries;  
4. To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a 
country (national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.); 
5. To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine 
action in; 
6. To assess the potential impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel 
landmines and the implementation of the four new Instruments on future mine action support 
from the EC to Latin America; 
7. To make recommendations to improve the identification, the definition, the implementation 
and the impact of EC-funded mine projects; 
8. To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among mine 
action programmes in Latin America and globally. 
METHODOLOGY 
The evaluation entailed: (i) preliminary planning and research; (ii) initial contact with EC staff in 
Brussels (iii) missions to the focus countries (Colombia and Peru); and (iv) additional contact 
with EC delegation staff in two further countries (Nicaragua and Chile); (v) a second round of 
meetings in Brussels with EC staff to discuss the initial findings; (vi) analysis and reporting.  
 
The Evaluation Team comprised Dr Russell Gasser, Director of Humanitarian Technology 
Consulting Limited and a former Fonctionnaire of the European Commission, supported in 
strategy and reporting by Dr Robert Keeley, Director of RK Consulting Ltd and a former Bomb 
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Country Timing Team Member 
Colombia 10th and 16th-20th December 2007 Russell Gasser  
Peru 11th to 15th December 2007 Russell Gasser 
 
In addition, it was possible to meet with staff of the EC Delegation in Nicaragua on 28th 
December 2007. 
 
Reporting included a country report on each of Colombia and Peru, and this overall strategic 
evaluation report. 
DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION CRITERIA 
The standard development evaluation criteria promoted by the OECD7 of Relevance, 
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability will be used in this evaluation, in line with 
the ToR: 
 
• Relevance: The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of 
the target group, recipient and donor. 
• Effectiveness: A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives. 
• Efficiency: Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to 
the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly 
resources possible in order to achieve the desired results.  
• Impact: The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, 
directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.  
• Sustainability: Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an 
activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. This includes 
environmental as well as financial sustainability8. 
 
                                                    
7 See OECD website for further information   
http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html 
8 The full terms of reference are attached in Annex I 
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2. GENERAL FINDINGS  
OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF ERW AND EC FUNDED MINE ACTION 
INITIATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA 
DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM 
Latin America has 14 countries with former or current mine and/or other Explosive Remnants of 
War (ERW) problems.  The 9 countries which still have contamination are indicated in bold type 
in the table below.  Only one country, Colombia, is seriously affected by mines and ERW.9  
 
Table 1 – Countries with former or current mine and/or ERW problems 
Argentina Argentina continues to claim the Falklands/Malvinas which are heavily 
contaminated, but no mines on the mainland.  See note 1, below. 
Chile Mostly border minefields, few casualties.  Clearance in progress. 
Colombia Widespread contamination due to an ongoing armed conflict.  
Continued new use of mines.  By far the most severely affected 
country in Latin America, hundreds of civilian casualties each year at 
present. 
Costa Rica Border minefields with Nicaragua cleared, declared free of known 
minefields 2002. 
Cuba Minefields around USA Guantánamo Bay base.  Some reports state 
these have now been cleared. 
Ecuador Contamination in border area with Peru from 1995 war.  Clearance 
under way.   
El 
Salvador 
El Salvador has claimed on several occasions since 1994 that it is 
totally or almost free from uncleared minefields.  Small numbers of 
residual mines and ERW are still being found.  
Guatemala One minefield only, cleared in 2005.  ERW also cleared.  Guatemala 
now declared free from known mines and ERW. 
Honduras  Border minefields cleared 2004.  Honduras now declared free from 
known minefields, though a few residual mines still reported. 
Nicaragua Clearance of border and remote minefields under way, about 130,000 
people still affected.  Completion probably 2008 or 2009.     
                                                    
9 Technically, a part of the problem in Colombia consists of mines (many of which are improvised mines) as well as 
IEDs and other ERW: as the conflict is continuing there are also items of explosive ordnance which are not abandoned 
nor remnants of war but active stockpiles and ordnance in current use. 
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Peru Two separate problems: the border with Ecuador and infrastructure in 
other parts of the country, especially electric line pylons.  Clearance 
under way - slow on border 
Panama UXO in former USA army ranges in canal zone.  No mines. 
Suriname Small number of mines finally cleared 2005.  A WW2 ammunition 
dump remains to be cleared. 
Venezuela 13 mined areas around naval bases.  Clearance currently planned for 
2011. 
 
Note 1: The inclusion of Argentina and the Falkland Islands is solely based on a geographical interpretation 
of “Latin America.” Inclusion of Argentina does not represent any official position of the EC or its member 
states, nor of the GICHD, on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas; nor does it reflect any opinion 
regarding responsibility for the clearance of the islands.  Similarly, the inclusion of Guantánamo indicates 
only a geographic interpretation.  
 
Note 2: The clearance of all known minefields cannot guarantee that all mines have been cleared, especially 
in remote areas. Residual “forgotten” mines and ERW must be expected in the same way that parts of 
Europe have residual contamination from the first and second World Wars.   
 
CASUALTIES AND CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Except for Colombia, the number of casualties due to ERW in Latin America is very small.  This 
is summarised in the table below.10   
In the whole of Latin America except Colombia, in 2005 the reported civilian casualties, 11 for 
both deaths and injuries together, was 25, of which 9 were due to mines and 16 due to other 
ERW.  In 2006 the total was 28, with 5 reported mine casualties, and a further 23 casualties from 
other ERW. These figures may be lower than the actual number due to under-reporting.  A larger 
number of UXO than mine casualties is usual in countries where there are not large displaced 
populations, for Latin America outside Colombia the ratio is very approximately three to five 
times as many UXO than mine casualties. About two thirds of the casualties in Colombia are 
military and police casualties from the continuing conflict.  These have not been included in this 
table.   
 
Table 2 – Casualties and clearance requirements in Latin America 





       2006 
Impact 
Argentina Falklands/Malvin
as all fenced & 
marked. 
About 2000 ha No 
casualties 
No casualties Low 
impact 
                                                    
10 Data from Landmine Monitor and APMBC Article 5 reports. 
11 Humanitarian deminers (but not military deminers) have also been included in these figures, the intention is to avoid 
confusing military combat casualties with civilian mine victims. 
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       2006 
Impact 











Colombia Large scale 
contamination.  
Details not 




Extensive, including 21 ha 
ready to be cleared 






















About 34 ha No 
casualties 
No casualties Low 
impact 
Nicaragua Border and 
remote 
minefields. 



















Panama UXO in former 
USA  ranges in 
canal zone.  No 
mines. 
Not known. Cost estimate  
US$500M - 650M 
No 
casualties 
No casualties Low 
impact 
Venezuela 13 mined areas 
around naval 
bases. 
0.6 ha No 
casualties 
No casualties No 
impact 
 
In Colombia, the defined mined area which can be cleared to international standards at present is 
also small (21 ha), and all other mined areas are in conflict zones.  The contamination in conflict 
zones is extensive with 60% of municipalities and 30 of 31 mainland departments affected.  The 
Colombian military undertakes operations called “Emergency humanitarian demining” however 
these are believed to be clearance in order to reduce humanitarian impact and not clearance 
according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), which would include quality 
management processes and reporting in the national mine action database. 
Argentina, which maintains a claim to the Falkland Islands and is in complex negotiations with 
the UK about mine clearance there, has no mines on the South American mainland.  The total 
area which will have to be cleared in the Falklands is about 2,000 hectares, all of which is fenced 
and marked.  There have been no casualties and the local population are on record as requesting 
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mine clearance should first be completed in other more urgent areas in other countries.   
Chile also has about 2,000 hectares to clear.  This is all stated as being marked and fenced and is 
almost all in border areas.  The casualty rates are low. The impact is low.  
 
Many of the mine affected areas are in border zones (international frontiers) or around military 
installations. The exceptions are Colombia which has a widespread mine problem and Peru which 
has both a border problem and also a separate problem with mined infrastructure inside the 
country.   
EC support for Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) compliance 
Central America has four countries already declared free of known minefields and Nicaragua is 
likely to reach this position in 2009.  The situation is not the same in South America where total 
clearance of remote border mines will be both expensive and time consuming.  The evaluation 
team notes that full compliance with the APMBC in its present form includes achieving 
“clearance of all known minefields” status.  However, the EC 2005 to 2007 mine action strategy 
has as its title “Towards zero victims,” and in most affected countries in Latin America victim 
rates are already low.  Article 6 of the Convention places an expectation on rich countries to 
assist those with fewer resources in achieving clearance.  Nevertheless this is not a full obligation 
and clearing all known minefields, especially within a short time limit, is prohibitively expensive 
in some countries.  Use of scarce resources to do this where there is little or no socio-economic 
impact is difficult to justify unless there are overriding political considerations. 
 
Without an end to the current conflict and extensive clearance activities, there is no prospect of 
Colombia reaching either full clearance of known mined areas or impact free status. 
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT  
In the years 2002 to 2007 an estimated 8 million euros of EC Mine Action funding was spent in 
Latin America, rather less than 3% of the total amount (final data are not yet available for 2007).  
Given the small number of countries and projects involved, it has been possible to compile what 
is considered to be a complete list of projects with co-financing from the EC12.  This does not 
include projects bilaterally (or multilaterally) funded by Member State governments. 
 
The full list is included in Annex 2. 
 
Table 3 – EC mine action funding 
Year Total EC mine 
action funding 
EC mine action funding for 
Latin America 
% for Latin 
America 
2002 – 04 145.2 million € 1.6 million € 1.1 % 
2005 - 06 107.8 million € 4.6 million € 4.3 % 
Total 253.0 million € 6.2 million € 2.4 % 
 
Data from Landmine monitor and EC project records.  
This level of funding allocation by the EC is broadly similar to overall funding distribution which shows 3% of 





                                                    
12 The list was compiled by contacting EC delegations (EuropeAid and ECHO staff) in the countries concerned and double-checking 
by searching the EC “CRIS” database by arrangement with RELEX staff.  The evaluation team wishes to thank the EC staff involved 
for their assistance and cooperation. 
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The division by year and EC budget line was as follows: 
 







allocated for EC 
co-financing 
2003 2 1,550,000 €
2004 1 5,000 €
2005 2 1,059,799 €
2006 4 3,529,114 €
2007 3 2,000,000 €




EC Budget Line Number of 
projects 
Amount Percentage 
Mine Action 8 5,555,000 € 68%
Human Rights  1 59,799 € 1%
Geographic (Colombia) 1 2,500,000 € 31%
ECHO (Emergency - Colombia) 2 29,114 € 0%
Total 12 8,143,913 € 100%
 
The ECHO Mine Action funding was in both cases a small amount of mine risk education (MRE) 
activities included in larger projects. 
Countries supported 
Since 2002 the EC has supported mine action in five countries of Latin America.  In South 
America: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru.  In Central America: Nicaragua.  The work on the 
Peru/Ecuador border was a single project. There was also funding for the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines  (ICBL) and Landmine Monitor, a total of 500,000€ worldwide and an 
estimate of 5,000€ of this (1%) has been included in the Latin America regional funding. 
 
Table 5 – EC funding by country, project and total value of EC co-financing 
Country Number of 
Projects 





Chile 1 1,000,000 € 12% 
Colombia  8 4,838,913 € 59% 
Nicaragua 1 1,300,000 € 16% 
Peru/Ecuador 1 1,000,000 € 12% 
Regional 1 5,000 € 0% 
Total 12  8,143,913 € 100% 
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Type of organisation supported 
Mine clearance in Latin America is a monopoly of national military, police and civil defence 
organisations, and with only a few exceptions funds to these organisations are channelled through 
the Organization of American States (OAS) Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines 
(AICMA) programme which primarily uses USA military personnel as trainers.  One exception 
was the EC support to Chile through the UNDP which principally supported training the Chilean 
military – the demining trainers in this case were also USA military personnel using the same 
train and equip model as the OAS. 
Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), as well as the military, undertake Mine Risk 
Education programmes in most affected countries.  Victim Assistance is supported by 
governments, NGOs and in some countries by the police and military for their own casualties.  
Money is either channelled through the OAS AICMA or directly contributed.  
Support for national capacity building has been given directly to the National Government in 





Table 6 – Organisations supported by EC co-funding 
Organisation supported Number of 
projects 
Amount allocated for 
EC co-financing 
Percentage 
Direct to National Governments 1 2,500,000 € 31% 
OAS - AICMA 2 2,300,000 € 28% 
Direct to NGOs 7 1,818,913 € 22% 
UNDP 1 1,000,000 € 12% 
Direct to Departmental 
Governments 
1 525,000 € 6% 
Total  12 8,143,913 € 100% 
Mine Action components supported 
All components of mine action have been supported in Latin America.  With only one project per 
country except for Colombia it is difficult to generalise, however there is a clear division between 
the “mine clearance” projects of the OAS AICMA in Peru/Ecuador and Nicaragua and the UNDP 
in Chile, which all follow the same model, and the MRE and national mine action capacity 
development projects in Colombia which are aimed at establishing and reinforcing the 
Colombian Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, the National 
Mine Action Authority and Centre. 
 
The three “demining” projects based in Chile, Nicaragua and Peru/Ecuador, in fact used a very 
substantial part of their resources for training and equipping deminers.  These were all nominally 
“integrated projects” which included limited amounts of MRE and Victim Assistance (VA), 
typically worth less than 10% of the total value of the project.  The MRE was undertaken by 
military personnel in the areas being cleared and did not use Community Liaison approaches 
which are now widely regarded as best practice.  The close linkage of MRE to demining activities 
is however a definite advantage.  The VA parts of these programmes have been more based on 
individual support to a small number of victims than on wider advocacy or structural approaches.  
This has not been entirely successful – in Peru, rehabilitation in the form of prostheses and 
training was offered for up to 14 people but reports state that only eight came forward.  In the 
 
 EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN LATIN AMERICA 
 FINAL VERSION| 10  
end, fewer than this number were actually helped (either three or five depending on the report).  
The victims’ association was cogently critical of the programme and continued to press for 
funding for an initial survey of victims to identify how many there are, and in which regions of 
the country, as this has not yet been done. 
 
In Colombia there is more attention given to MRE and advocacy based VA, in part because 
demining is not open to the substantial NGO sector. Given the very widespread nature of the 
contamination, and the millions of displaced people, there is a very substantial demand for MRE 
which is being addressed through local government and NGOs co-funded by the EC, primarily 
using a Community Liaison (CL) type of approach. (UNICEF also has a substantial CL based 
programme in Colombia).  Medical assistance to mine victims is available through the 
Colombian national health system, but the rural population who suffers mine accidents (over 97% 
of accidents are in rural areas) face substantial difficulties in accessing the available health and 
rehabilitation services.  The barriers include physical remoteness making access extremely 
difficult at times, a lack of information and knowledge of health rights, and even possible risk to 
mine victims or their families from being perceived as having been injured either while laying 
mines (and hence sympathisers with the armed factions) or as having tried to clear mines (and 
hence opposing the armed factions)13. 
 
The largest single funding item by the EC has been the 2.5 million euros (31% of the total Latin 
America funding) for capacity building of the National Mine Action Authority in Colombia of 
which about 800,000 euros is planned to be used on a rapid survey of impact and victims starting 
in 2008 (within the constraints of an ongoing conflict).  
EVALUATION OF THE EC STRATEGY 
SELECTION OF WHERE TO ACT 
Country Strategy Papers CSP 
The inclusion of mine action in the national (or regional) Country Strategy Paper (CSP), in itself 
based on national government priorities has in recent years assumed increasing importance, due 
to (a) the commitment of the EC to the Declaration of Paris and (b) the ending of thematic budget 
lines and start of the four new Instruments as the basis for funding development cooperation by 
the EC. 
 





Mine Action in CSP 2002-2006 Mine Action in CSP 2007-2013 
 
Argentina No No 
Chile No –  1 project funded No 
Colombia Yes – 5 projects funded Yes - 3 projects funded 
Ecuador Yes  - 1 project funded jointly with 
Peru 
No (ongoing project listed once 
without comment) 
Nicaragua No (one mention of existence of 
budget line but no other 
No 
                                                    
13 Further information is included in the country report. 
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information) – 1 project funded 
Peru Yes but only for border mines – 1 
project funded jointly with 
Ecuador 
Yes – both border and other mines 
Panama No No 








The very limited inclusion of mine action in the Country Strategy Papers of Latin American 
countries with ERW contamination suggests that the problem is not a critical issue for many 
countries.  Only Colombia and Peru have included mine action in both 2002-6 and 2007-13 
CSPs.  This reflects the reality of mine contamination in the region, only these two countries have 
a significant problem due to mines and other ERW, though it should be emphasised that the 
Colombian problem is far more widespread and severe than in Peru. 
 
The ratio of mine action horizontal budget line to geographic budget line funding (roughly two-
thirds horizontal and one-third geographic) is the reverse of the world-wide ratio.  There has been 
only one mine action project funded from a geographic budget line in Latin America, in 
Colombia.  This raises questions about the relevance of some of the funding allocated from the 
thematic Mine Action budget as the actions are not matched by similar commitments from the 
geographic budget lines 
Country selection criteria 
In the 2005 Global review of EC Mine Action the criteria and mechanism for selecting countries 
to receive support to mine action were discussed in some detail.  In selecting which countries to 
focus on, and also the actions to be supported in each country, the use of the Resiliance-Impact 
Matrix (RIM) was proposed; other similar assessment tools might also be suitable.  “Resiliance” 
is the term used in risk and disaster management for the property of ability to recover from a 
disabling event, this attribute is very much the same as that usually described by the term 
“Capacity” for development potential, and either resilience or capacity could be used in 
developing this visual approach.15 There is a clear need to set objective and verifiable selection 
criteria in terms of relevance – i.e. select which actions in which places will most contribute to 
realising the overall strategic goals.  The basic RIM diagram described in the 2005 Global review 
proposed the uses of a previous stage of Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) as part of the overall 
process. 16  The RIM diagram schematic and a proposed analysis for the countries in this 






                                                    
15 The RIM diagram is based on the concept of “Resilience” as applied to a country contaminated with ERW – a typical 
dictionary definition of resilience is Merriam-Websters “an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or 
change”.  In mine action an example is the name of the “Cranfield Resilience Centre”, a part of Cranfield University. 
16 
See the 2005 Global Evaluation for further details.  The RIM diagram was first presented in the 2005 report, and 
later refined by Keeley in his PhD thesis.  The concept was included in the 2007 Evaluation of Netherland Government 
funding for Mine Action by TNO for the Netherlands foreign ministry. 
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Figure 1 – RIM diagram  
 
 
The nine mine/ERW affected countries in the region can be placed on a RIM diagram as follows: 
 








Note: Ecuador and Peru are linked as they have a border minefield whose removal is considered to be 
important in terms of the consolidation of the peace process between the two countries.  Without this, the 
impact on Ecuador would be very low, like Chile.  Peru has further impact from mined areas around internal 
infrastructure. 
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Colombia 
Use of the resilience-impact analysis suggests that the optimum regional strategy  would be to 
focus resources on Colombia, which has medium to high resilience in terms of Latin America and 
a very severe mine problem.  With Colombia receiving 59% of the total funding this was largely 
the case, and this allocation can be seen as relevant.  There are external limiting factors (Log 
Frame assumptions) which have a negative impact on this relevance.  The most important are the 
ongoing conflict which limits both access and the possibility of marking, mapping and demining 
as the mined areas are still active, and secondly the monopoly on demining by the military which 
leaves to NGOs and other actors (including the national mine action structures) only the roles of 
Mine Risk Education, Advocacy and Victim Assistance.  This may in practice limit the amount of 
funding that can usefully be spent – an effectiveness issue.  The RIM analysis suggests that the 
most appropriate type of actions to support in Colombia would be Management training, local 
capacity building and train and equip programmes.  Given the limitation that mine clearance 
cannot be funded, these priorities are otherwise fully reflected in the funding allocated which can 
thus be seen as relevant, given the assumptions. There are a number of strategic effectiveness and 
efficiency issues which will be discussed in the section on the role of the OAS, below.  
Nicaragua 
Nicaragua has very low resilience (it is the second poorest country in the hemisphere, has a weak 
economy, has suffered political turmoil for decades and suffers frequent natural disasters).  
Nicaragua also has low total contamination and low mine impact overall; the CSP does not 
mention mine action.  This suggests that either no action or a modest non-sustainable clearance 
operation might be the most suitable linked to the development of a small permanent capacity to 
take care of residual contamination.  In practice, the EC funding was channelled through the OAS 
AICMA programme which does not share these goals leading to poor relevance. 
Ecuador/Peru border  
Ecuador/Peru border clearance has low to moderate resilience (again, in terms of Latin America) 
but only minor contamination in a mostly remote border region.  There is some impact on cross-
border transit and trade, and possibly on future mineral exploitation, but the most important 
reason for demining is to reinforce and consolidate the peace process between the two countries.  
The mines were placed during a bitter border conflict (the last of a long series) as recently as 
1995.  The RIM analysis suggests that in terms of mine clearance the best approach would be 
quick clearance and limited long term capacity building.  However, the goal of mine clearance 
was secondary to the strategic goal of consolidation of a peace process so limitations in 
effectiveness and efficiency could be tolerated in order to have a greater impact on the political 
outcome. Introducing a specialist third-party demining organisation might have been optimal in 
terms of clearance, but would have raised concerns about security and perhaps bred mistrust. 
Working with the established military of both countries was more useful in bringing about 
rapprochement and building confidence.   The EC funding was channelled through the OAS 
AICMA programme which engages with the military of each country to train humanitarian 
deminers within the military structures.  In terms of peace-building this was a highly relevant 
approach, and there has been real progress in establishing and maintaining contact, and some 
collaboration, between the Ecuadorian and Peruvian military.  Regrettably this has been 
accompanied by very low efficiency, especially on the Peruvian side of the border.  Future 
funding, if considered, should not simply repeat the previous model – the political situation has 
moved forward to such a degree that re-analysis is necessary and a far greater focus in the 
strategy on efficiency and effectiveness is now necessary. 
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Peru  
In addition to mines on the Ecuador border, Peru has also a mine problem inside the country, with 
areas around electric pylons (transmission line towers), and some prisons and police bases being 
contaminated as a result of protective mining by special police units during the internal armed 
conflict in the 1980s and 1990s.  This contamination appears to have caused more casualties than 
the mines on the border with Ecuador, but has received far less attention; it is not mentioned in 
the CSP 2002-6.  Clearance of these mined areas is novel in several aspects.  First, it is paid for 
by the privatised electric companies, which brings about pressure to do the clearance quickly and 
cheaply.  Despite the waste of resources in repeating unsatisfactory clearance, this demining 
appears to be considerably cheaper than any other mine clearance in Latin America.17  Secondly, 
it has been done by an initially poorly equipped and poorly trained police force, which suffered 
about 80 deminer casualties in the process.  Almost all other clearance in Latin America appears 
to have been done by military personnel, trained and equipped through the OAS AICMA and 
USA military “Train the Trainers” programmes.  This high number of casualties led to the first 
victims’ association in Peru being started by ex-deminers from the police force.  Quality 
management has been so poor that some areas have had to be cleared three times over as there 
were further civilian casualties after the first and second clearance.  A third novel aspect is that 
Quality Control is now provided by ex-deminers from the victim’ association observing demining 
activities, an arrangement that appears to be working well.  Further information is included in the 
country report on Peru.   
 
There appears to have been a clear opportunity for international support to training and equipping 
this police unit, especially in the context of developing a long-term capacity in the country to deal 
with residual contamination. This was met, at least in part, by the OAS.  Support may have been 
limited due to three factors: 
There is a much lower political profile for this internal demining that the international border. 
The funding for the demining of the pylons comes from the privatised electric companies.  This 
may make some donors cautious about involvement – though there would appear to be no clear 
reason why supporting training and equipping police units working on a commercial contract 
should be any less acceptable than training and equipping military units from a humanitarian 
budget. 
The police unit does not entirely fit in to the military-to-military model of training usually 
employed by the OAS and USA programmes. 
 
Use of RIM analysis suggests that one of the appropriate actions would be funding a non-
sustainable clearance programme to remove the mines as quickly as possible backed up with a 
small long-term capacity.  This is essentially what the police demining unit is attempting.  
Introducing elements of “train and equip” (group C in the RIM diagram) can also be justified.  
Peru is located near the centre of the RIM diagram so a variety of options should be considered.  
The needs of internal mine clearance in Peru were not identified in the CSP 2002-6.  Given the 
possibilities of a modest amount of financing having a significant impact on this work there may 
have been a missed opportunity to intervene at an early stage to ensure an improved quality of 
clearance and fewer deminer casualties   
 
                                                    
17 Peru’s request for an extension to the time period for clearance under Article V of the APMBC￼ states that the 
police have 80 deminers and the army 160.  The cost estimates are that police re-clearance of over 1,000 pylons, plus 
clearance of about 18,000 mines around three prisons and two police bases will have a total cost of 650,000 US dollars.  
The police have already cleared about 60,000 mines.  The cost of army clearance (in the remote and difficult) border 
region, is estimated at 20 million dollars for about 31,000 mines in 210,000 sq m of hazardous areas.  The army has so 
far cleared about 1,600 mines.  There are currently more casualties from the internal mines than the border mines. 
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The appropriate inclusion of mine action in the CSP for 2007 to 2013 corrected this earlier 
omission. 
Chile 
The selection of Chile as a recipient of funding from the Mine Action budget line, for one project, 
appears to be based on strategic importance, linked to Chile’s support of the APMBC and having 
in place national mine action structures.  In terms of the RIM analysis, Chile is an upper-middle 
income country with a modest problem having low impact and causing few casualties.  This 
suggests that either no external intervention, or at most the provision of management training 
should be considered.  The overall relevance of the funding for Chile is based on larger strategic 
considerations of the EC and not on the mine problem as such.   
 
The Chilean minefield on the border with Peru is of concern to Peru where it has some impact.  
Peru formally protested to the OAS about the two border minefields in April 2007 and insisted 
that they should be cleared.  The EC funding for Chile was originally designated for “high 
impact” border mine clearance.  In the end it was used for other purposes (see text box for further 
details) leaving the border contaminated.  The Peruvian position suggests that the change of 
purpose of the funding (from border clearance to capacity building) was a clear and significant 
reduction in the relevance of the project and the end result had poor relevance. 
Other countries 
Cuba, Panama and Venezuela have contamination which has little or no impact and no casualties.  
Argentina, in its claim to the Falklands, has a mine problem which has no casualties and modest 
impact.  All these countries have sufficient resilience to deal with the problems.  There is no case 
for external assistance either in terms of RIM analysis or based on the EC strategy of “Towards a 
Zero Victim Target.”  Future political considerations may over-rule this. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
Mine clearance projects in Chile, Peru/Ecuador and Nicaragua 
These projects all had a very strong emphasis on training and equipping deminers, so might be 
expected to have strong sustainability.  However, they all resulted in high cost clearance (per 
square metre) and inefficient working methods (such as two and three person drills) that they are 
generally not affordable by in the long term by the countries concerned.   They all fell 
significantly short of the clearance targets in the proposals. The project in Nicaragua, for 
example, funded in 2003 and completed in 2006, is described as bringing mine clearance to and 
end in the country which would then be free from known minefields.  However, clearance in 
Nicaragua is now scheduled to end in 2009 after substantial further funding.  Given the definition 
the “Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to 
continue after donor funding has been withdrawn” all of these projects had poor to medium 
sustainability.18  The limited contamination and the absence of mine clearance from the CSPs for 
Chile and Nicaragua strongly suggest that the national governments do not consider mine action 
to be a high priority. 
 
                                                    
18 When capacity which had been built through a similar process was handed over to national control in Costa Rica the 
programme came to a halt until further donor funding could be found,  It appears likely that the same would have 
happened in Nicaragua and Peru/Ecuador if clearance had been fully handed over.  A similar problem in Bosnia was 
reported in the 2005 Global Assessment. 
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Support to national capacity, and MRE in Colombia 
While the substantial funding to the national mine action centre in Colombia has not delivered the 
anticipated results, it has made a real difference to the national structures.  The Government of 
Colombia has also contributed a significant part of the costs of the “Observatorio de Minas” and 
the subsequent Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal.   
 
Support for Mine Risk Education by NGOs, and also local government in the most affected 
department is unlikely to be entirely sustainable once funding ends, but is likely to have a long 
term impact and leave a significant number of local staff trained in Community Liaison 
techniques of MRE.  
 
The sustainability is therefore evaluated as being medium to good. 
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF PROJECTS WITH POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
As has been noted above, some mine action projects are selected because of the relevance of their 
political context – one example is the mine clearance on the Peru/Ecuador border in support of 
consolidating the peace process.  To evaluate these projects adequately requires some analysis of 
the criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact) in terms of both the 
overall strategic objective and also the mine action.  There appears to be no easy way at present 
of conducting such a dual evaluation and the focus appears to be more on technical goals than 
strategic goals.  It is important to note that the overall aim should be not one or the other, but for 
the project design and implementation to have positive impact and strong sustainability in both 
areas 
 
 EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN LATIN AMERICA 
 FINAL VERSION| 17  
Textbox 1- Improving relevance requires basing future strategy on current 
experience
The EC Mine Action Strategy (MAS) 2005-7 states: "In response to a request by the Chilean 
government this programming will support mine clearance in high impact areas, namely 
cross-border mine clearance between Chile and its neighbors (Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina) 
where mine fields still pose security problems." 
 
The MAS includes six criteria for selection of geographic areas for action, as follows: 
“ - Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty, 
- High Humanitarian and Developmental Need, 
- Strategic Importance for the European Union, 
- Sustainability and Coherence with Wider Assistance, 
- Proven Commitment of Non-States Parties to Mine Action and the Principles of the MBT, 
- Efficiency and Effectiveness of Local/National Mine Action Planning and Programmes.” 
 
Chile has few mine casualties and mine action is not mentioned in the Country Strategy 
Paper. Chile is not a poor country. However, after a period of broken relations, the EU and 
Chile concluded an Association Agreement in 2002.  The subsequent political rapprochement 
and further negotiations qualified Chile as being of “Strategic Importance for the European 
Union,” Chile is actively implementing the APMBC and has effective national mine action 
planning.  Thus responding to the request was entirely in line with the EC Mine Action 
Strategy. 
 
The project documents reflect this political strategy as the highest level goal was defined as 
improving both regional stability and the relationships between Chile and its neighbors. 
 
The project spent most of the funding on capacity building of the national armed forces by 
USA army trainers, and worked on clearance of just two mined areas important for the tourist 
industry and for international relations with neighboring countries.  The project evaluations 
noted that the amount of clearance was far lower than originally planned in the project 
documents, just 3% of the original goal, but considered this as acceptable given the 
circumstances.  In the end, over 40 dollars was spent for each square meter of land actually 
demined. 
 
Capacity development may well have been appropriate, but it is clear that there was a shift 
away from the originally stated strategic goal of the EC to support "high impact" border 
demining.  For Peru, the mines in Chile that cause Peruvian victims are an important issue 
and in April 2007 Peru formally protested to the OAS about border minefields in Chilean 
territory.  However, these minefields were not the ones cleared by the programme. 
 
The change in purpose of this 1M€ funding raises questions about the relationship between 
the planned strategy and project implementation. There was no clearance in the original 
strategic border areas defined in the original report, and just 3% of the stated target 
clearance in the new zone was actually cleared. Several causes can be identified for not 
achieving the technical goals as stated in the proposal– three are discussed in this 
evaluation: fragmentation and isolation of EC mine action personnel resources, limited 
communications among EC delegations on the topic of mine action, and non-specialist EC 
staff having to conclude a contract involving highly experienced demining specialists. 
 
Despite the strategic goal of international rapprochement between Chile and its neighbors 
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THE ROLE OF THE OAS AICMA AND ITS IMPACT ON MINE ACTION IN 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE USE OF THE EC FUNDING 
The Mine Action programme of the Organization of American States (OAS) dominates mine 
action in Latin America both in terms of its long historical record and also the number of 
projects, two of which have received a total of 2.3M€ from the EC, 28% of the total spent by the 
EC in Latin America.  Some discussion of the AICMA programme is necessary to illuminate the 
very substantial difference in the way mine clearance operations are conducted in Latin America 
compared with much of the rest of the world.   
 
The OAS19 itself dates from 1948 and all 35 independent countries of the Americas belong to the 
Organization20. “Taking action against landmines” is listed as one of 16 “Key OAS issues” on its 
website. In 1991, the OAS created the Assistance Program for Demining in Central America 
(PADCA)21. This program began as an exclusively technical demining operation composed of 
programs to strengthen national capacity by training and equipping national military personnel to 
locate and clear minefields. Because demining activities were – and still are - generally 
considered a military responsibility by national authorities in Latin America, the military was the 
sole entity involved in most of the early demining activities.22  PADCA evolved into the current 
Program for Comprehensive Action Against Anti-personnel Mines (AICMA) which also includes 
national armed forces carrying out mine risk education (MRE) campaigns in areas of demining 
operations and some smaller scale support for victim assistance, survey and advocacy23. 
 
The OAS programmes thus predate the Ottawa process of 1996, and the signing of the Anti-
personnel Mine Ban Convention in Ottawa in December 1997. They also provide a demining 
model that is a de facto monopoly by military, special police or government civil defence.  By far 
the most usual approach remains the training of serving military personnel as humanitarian 
deminers through direct military-to-military programmes.  The evaluation team has not found any 
reports of NGO or commercial mine clearance in Latin America.   
 
The AICMA programme is an agent, or channel, for funding, and runs single donor and multi-
donor projects.  Its role can be compared with that of the UNDP which acts in a similar capacity 
in many countries.  In Chile, the project funded by the EC used UNDP as the funding channel, 
but in other respects used the “standard” Latin America model, developed by the OAS, of 
national military personnel being trained as humanitarian deminers and undertaking mine and 








                                                    
19 Further information can be found on the website  http://www.oas.org 
20 Cuba remains a member, but its government has been excluded from participation in the OAS since 1962 
21 Further information can be found in the “Journal of Mine Action” on-line at 
http://maic.jmu.edu/JOURNAL/9.1/Focus/ruan/ruan.htm  
22 See OAS website for further information on this point. 
23 The program has provided physical and psychological rehabilitation services to 884 landmine victims since 1997 and 
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Figure 3 –Map showing OAS AICMA interventions24 
 
Despite what might appear to be a number of advantages in terms of recruitment and overheads, 
the AICMA programmes, and the UNDP programme in Chile, appear to have a number of very 
serious disadvantages in terms of their integration into the humanitarian aid context of EC mine 
action funding.  
• There appears to be no clear interface to the working methods of EuropeAid, such as 
Project Cycle Management25 and Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development 
(LRRD), thus making integration with larger development goals and established 
management practice, harder to achieve and document.   
• The effectiveness and efficiency of many of the programmes appears to be very 
significantly less than mine clearance by NGOs and commercial companies in other 
parts of the world.  This is shown both in terms of overall figures for, inter alia, 
clearance and victim support, and also by such details as the continued use of two or 
three person clearance drills (instead of single person drills) and in some countries 
military style protective equipment instead of the newer personal protective 
equipment (PPE) designed to facilitate humanitarian operations.  The value of 
serving military personnel in uniform undertaking MRE has been widely questioned 
elsewhere.  Given that AICMA is acting as an agent on behalf of the donors it should 
have a clear role in managing efficiency and effectiveness for the donors. 
• There has been a strong emphasis on national capacity building, and little difference 
in the programme from one country to the next – essentially a “one size fits all” 
                                                    
24 From http://www.aicma.oas.org.  The only ERW contaminated countries not included in the AICMA actions are 
Cuba, Panama and Venezuela, none of which suffers significant impact and none has any casualties. 
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approach.  The very different circumstances of different nations in Latin America, 
both in terms of mine impact and resilience/capacity, suggests that considerable 
flexibility is needed.  Capacity building is not guaranteed to give the best results 
where – as is common in Latin America – the scale of contamination is limited and 
clearance of all known minefields, or risk-free status, is likely to be achieved in a few 
years.  Having a single modus operandi of always working with national military or 
civil defence staff, and not using international NGOs or commercial companies, has 
as a consequence the need for every country to start from the beginning and develop 
its own national capacity based on national personnel, usually trained by other 
military personnel.  The aim is for hand-over of mine clearance to full national 
control, though in practice it has be found to be very difficult to fund the resulting 
capacity from national resources and the hand-over may take place only shortly 
before finishing clearance, as happened in the case of Costa Rica. A project oriented 
approach where one or more NGO or commercial organisations cleared all the 
hazardous area would probably have been significantly more cost-effective. 
 
Since the OAS program predates both the Ottawa process and the EC APL Regulation it is 
understandable that EC interventions in mine action in Latin America generally took the form of 
an investment in these existing structures. However, the evaluation team considers that the 
structure of the OAS program has some important questions to answer in terms of value for 
money and the proportion of resources spent on capacity development as compared to actual 
clearance. The OAS programs also tend to conduct MRE in what is generally considered an 
outdated manner using military instructors (who tend to describe mines) rather than deliver a 
public health/behavior change model as adopted by the most of the rest of the global mine action 
community. 
 
The potential advantages of a regional approach to mine action by the EC in Latin America are 
clear.  Reduction in the fragmentation of resources and isolation of 
Individual project officers would be welcome.  However, it is clear that the OAS – despite its 
leading role in mine action in the region – is not at present working in a way that is either (a) 
compatible with the EC’s development based approach or (b) offers a realistic level of efficiency. 
 
The recommendations of this report (see page 45) include the need for any future EC investment 
in mine action in Latin America to take more steps to conduct an appraisal to determine the 
appropriate program model and to ensure value for money of the proposed intervention26. In 
some cases there may be a case for a new intervention mechanism: for example the OAS could 
manage a clearance contract on behalf of the EC where the implementer was chosen by a 
competitive bidding process. The relationship between the EC and the OAS could potentially be 
managed in a similar process to the FAFA (Framework Agreement on Finance and 








                                                    
26 Such an appraisal obviously requires specialist technical expertise.  In practice it seems that finding a way to contract 
such expertise within EC structures may be a substantial obstacle to such an approach. 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN LATIN AMERICA 
FINAL VERSION| 21  




The main thrust of the OAS AICMA programme is mine clearance and in particular training 
national military personnel to be humanitarian deminers. While an exact figure for the donor 
funds channelled through the OAS for demining is difficult to obtain, it appears to be well over 
40 million dollars in direct contributions and perhaps a further 12 million in contributions in 
kind.  The total area cleared, 336 hectares, is very modest for this level of funding, giving a cost 
of over US$15 per square metre cleared.  This compares unfavourably with the clearance costs 
in many NGO and commercial programmes world-wide, but it is consistent with high costs 
elsewhere when demining is done by serving military personnel.  
 
The Peru-Ecuador border clearance proposal by AICMA, for the year to follow on from the EC 
funding proposes clearance of 26,000 sq metres at an overall cost of $40 per square metre 
cleared. Despite the extremely difficult terrain this is very high indeed, as is the 36% of the 
budget for the item “Supervision and Administration,” a percentage that is not untypical in Latin 
America but is very high when compared to the rest of the world. It is extremely unlikely that 
the land is worth anything close to $40 per square metre after clearance. If it is not possible to 
use standard investment appraisal, project cycle management techniques and other efficiency 
measures to significantly reduce the costs, money spent demining at this high cost level is 
generally better spent in mapping and marking hazardous areas, and then providing health, 
education or other development services to local people instead of demining. 
 
The Colombia mine clearance programme of AICMA provided similarly disappointing figures 
with a total of about 1 sq m cleared per deminer in the programme per day.  This is also a very 
unfavourable rate; the GICHD “Study of Manual Mine Clearance” reported typical rates of 8 to 
75 sq m per deminer per day.  The cause of such low daily rates may not be the actual demining 
but due to limited deployment of deminers for other reasons.  Excess demining capacity might 
also be a cause.  
 
This brief analysis is provided as background to the conclusions drawn at the end of this report; 
the evaluation is clearly focused on the EC and not the AICMA programme, and had limited 
time and resources so the evaluator was not able to spend time visiting the projects in question.  
It is entirely possible that there are extenuating circumstances that go some way to explain these 
very high costs.  Access by the non-specialists in the EC delegations to suitably qualified and 
independent technical advice at the earliest stages of the project planning process would help 
manage such risks, and reduce the impact of the experience and size of the AICMA programme 
resulting in distortion of EC project design and implementation, especially when the EC project 
officer may have only one mine action project in a large portfolio and little or no previous 
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RECENT REFORMS TO EC FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IMPACT ON 
MINE ACTION 
The response of the European Institutions to “the antipersonnel landmine problem” has had three 
principal dimensions: 
- A political response, principally in support of the Mine Ban Treaty and its implementation and 
universalisation.  
- An aid and development response to the impact of landmines (or suspected mines) on local 
people, and also on development activities, in mine affected countries.  This includes MRE, 
demining, victim assistance and other activities.  There is also emergency aid (humanitarian aid) 
administered by ECHO, principally emergency mine awareness training and emergency mine 
clearance. 
- A security response, principally where the presence of mines or ERW could lead to instability in 
a country or region (typically by initiating or prolonging a conflict) or where the presence of 
stockpiles or dumps of abandoned munitions could create security problems. 
 
An “APL regulation” in two parts was approved by the Parliament in 2001 and in accordance 
with the Regulation a Mine Action Strategy was developed by the Commission for 2002-2004 
and subsequently 2005-2007.  The Regulation established a thematic or “horizontal” budget line 
for mine action of roughly 15M€ per year 2002-4 rising to about 19M€ per year 2005-7, which is 
complemented the mine action funding available from geographic (national or regional) and other 
EC and EDF budget lines, and bilateral donations from EU member states.  In the entire period 
2002-7 the thematic budget line comprised about 40% of the EC contribution and about 10% of 
the total if Member States’ bilateral donations are included.   
 
The horizontal budget line opened up two possibilities in addition to funding geographically 
based Mine Action: 
 Funding non-geographic activities such as the global (world-wide) support for “universalisation 
of the Mine Ban Treaty,” and 
 Creating a small core group of staff in Brussels who could provide a focus point of knowledge 
and information about mine action and would also provide the resources to generate the EC-wide 
mine action strategy and ensure the agreement of all relevant directorates general - in itself a 
significant task. 
 
The process of enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25, then 27, members led to the 
need for a re-think of the entire Foreign Policy structures and instruments.  The previous 
approach was no longer viable for a much larger community.  Reorganisation led to a significant 
streamlining, with the creation in 1999 of the post of High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy that is effectively “Foreign Minister” of the EU.  This had significant 
impacts of both the Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP and also the way that foreign 
development aid was to be addressed, including mine action.   
 
To define the new approach to development aid, the Commission set out a strategy and 
framework in February and July 2004 and then wrote detailed proposals which were presented to 
the Parliament and Council in September 2004.  Essentially, a multiplicity of old instruments and 
many small individual thematic budget lines were to be replaced by just four new instruments: an 
Instrument for Stability, a financial Instrument for Development Co-operation and for Economic 
Co-operation (DCECI), a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and an 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). Funding for mine action (except in countries with 
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crises or emerging crises) would all be from geographic budget lines and would thus depend on 
the prioritisation of mine action by the national government leading to its inclusion in the EC 
Country Strategy Paper. In the case of situations of crisis or emerging crisis Mine Action is 
covered by the new Instrument for Stability under Article 3.   With the exception of this short-
term response to crisis in the IFS, the new instruments share a large-scale, macro level and mid to 
long term approach. 
 
The Commission paper of September 2004 demonstrates that the issue of non-geographic funding 
was already known about: 
 
Page 11: In some cases, the pursuit of a given policy objective will require that funds are not 
programmed geographically, as they serve multilateral objectives, for example, to enable the 
European Union to promote its environmental aims in a multilateral context, independent of the 
priorities of individual beneficiaries.  
 
After due process, the Instrument for Stability, Regulation (EC) 1717/2006, was adopted on 15 
November 2006, following a vote in the Parliament and consensus approval by the Council. 
DECONCENTRATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS 
DECLARATION 
The process of "deconcentration" in EuropeAid, which moved programming and project 
management from Brussels to the EC delegations in the partner countries or regions, was both an 
essential early stage of the reforms to the instruments, and was also one step of several in moving 
to aid delivery based on partnership between the countries involved, rather than donor policy 
alone. 
 
The strong commitment of the EU to the Paris Declaration of March 2005 is part of the overall 
reform of development aid and the move towards development cooperation.  The Paris 
Declaration was itself part of a larger process which included the Rome Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in 2003 and the Marrakesh meeting on Managing for Development Results in 2004.  
Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Paris Declaration is perhaps the key: 
 
 Donors commit to: Base their overall support — country strategies, policy 
 dialogues and development co-operation programmes — on partners’ national 
 development strategies and periodic reviews of progress in implementing these 
 strategies.  
 
EC support for mine action is thus to be based on the established Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) 
written by the EC delegations in partner countries, in close coordination with national authorities 
and governments.  The CSPs will reflect the development strategies of the national governments, 
including poverty reduction strategies and other plans.  This is a significant change in some areas 
which had previously relied in part on funding through thematic budget lines, one of which is 
mine action.  Latin America provides clear examples of other areas where the apparently 
unintended impact of the new Instruments is perhaps more severe than in Mine Action; post 
disaster reconstruction is a particularly good example.  Given the large scale and the importance 
of the funding affected by the lack of a “rapid-response” mechanism in the instrument it appears 
possible that this will be addressed in the near future.  This may provide an opportunity for mine 
action to benefit from synergies with other funding areas. 
A further example of the problems arising, which will have to be resolved, was evident in 
Colombia.  Mine Action is very much limited in Colombia by the active conflict in much of the 
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country.  At present there is no peace process, the current President was re-elected on a platform 
of pursuing a military victory over the armed factions, without negotiation.  However, the EC 
delegation would like to develop a strategy for supporting a peace process so that they would be 
able to respond quickly if a change in policy means that negotiations are started.  Part of the EC 
response is likely to be mine action as a peace building and confidence building measure, as well 
as emergency mine action in support of the return of the millions of displaced persons.  The 
delegation would like to have at least outline plans in place in order to be able to move swiftly in 
response to any opportunity to promote a resolution to the long running conflict.  However, the 
Government of Colombia does not entertain this in its policy documents so there are difficulties 
about including the action in the CSP.  It will take time for the new instruments based on the 
Paris declaration to have new mechanisms associated with them to resolve these issues.  
LOCATION OF MINE ACTION STRATEGY WITHIN THE “THREE PILLARS” 
STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION27 
The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht which established the European Union, divided EU policies into 
three main areas, called pillars.  The first or 'Community' pillar concerns economic, social and 
environmental policies.  The second or 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' (CFSP) pillar 
concerns foreign policy and military matters.  The third or 'Police and Judicial Co-operation in 
Criminal Matters' (PJCC) pillar concerns co-operation in the fight against crime.  
 
The aid and development aspects of mine action are first pillar responsibilities, and the security 
aspects are second pillar.  Generally, mine action has been considered as within the first pillar, so 
the procedures are that the Parliament would enact legislation, and the Commission would be 
responsible for development and implementation of mine action strategy.  The APL horizontal 
budget lines provided a mechanism to fund some of the aspects of mine action not associated 
with geographic budget lines (see below).  For the second pillar the relevant bodies are (usually) 
the Council Secretariat proposing projects which are implemented by joint action at an inter-
governmental level by Member State ministries (possibly by a sub-group of member states) after 
agreement by consensus in the European Council.  This may appear a small difference, but 
currently, since the reforms of 2006 which removed the thematic budget lines and introduced the 
four new Instruments, it is considered as having the potential for an impact on EC Mine Action. 
First, it further increases already serious fragmentation by bringing in an entire new “pillar” with 
different procedures, and secondly it could possibly move the focus of mine action towards being 
regarded as a security issue instead of a development issue.  
CONSEQUENCES FOR MINE ACTION OF THE REFORMS 
The new EC instruments appear to have taken the mine action community by surprise in 2006, 
perhaps because there is no overall "policy watch" institute for mine action. Other development 
sectors had earlier made responses - such as the European Confederation of Development NGOs 
who report that they succeeded in influencing the content of the Instrument for Stability28.  
 
Similarly, inside the EC, staff who worked on the APL horizontal budget line do not appear to 
have issued an advance warning to the mine action community which was then acted on - perhaps 
they were constrained in their response by larger institutional considerations, or maybe were 
simply so busy with current work that the longer term implications were not addressed in time. 
 
                                                    
27 The evaluation team thanks Antoine Gouzée de Harven and David Spence, both of the European Commission, for 
valuable discussions and encouragement in preparing this section 
28 See http://www.concordeurope.org  
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The overall effect is that the new instruments have some negative consequences - apparently 
unintended - which were not addressed in good time and which now require attention if they are 
to beaddressed in time for the review of the instruments in 2009.  The changes could lead to a 
reduction of the funding for Mine Action by the EC in the short term as the move is made to 
funding all mine action from geographic budget lines.  In countries where it has not been done 
this will require the inclusion of mine action in Country Strategy Papers at their next review.  In 
practice the reduction is likely to be minor in Latin America; the only two countries with 
significant contamination by ERW which is causing an impact (Colombia and Peru) have both 
included mine action in their CSPs for 2002 to 2006 and also 2007 to 2013.  The “rebound” to 
previous levels of funding, with the prioritisation process more fully in line with the Paris 
Declaration is likely to be swift. However, the changes will also create serious difficulties for the 
non-geographic funding from the APL budget line, which amounted to 3,9M€ in 2005-7; this is 
less than 7% of the APL budget line.  Nonetheless, some of the actions supported were of some 
importance. 
 
The key areas of mine action which it appears cannot easily be funded from Geographic (country 
or regional) budget lines as they have no clearly identifiable geographic component are:  
 
• Support for universalisation of the MBT including linkage to ERW or cluster 
munitions, as well as its general geographical extension to countries that are not yet 
states parties.  In 2005-7 “Monitoring of APL issues (Landmine Monitor) and 
Campaigning including Sponsorship programmes and monitoring of compliance and 
effectiveness of past efforts” received 1.4M€.  The loss of actions to promote 
universalisation is unlikely to have an impact in Latin America apart from the case of 
Cuba which is still not a signatory of the MBT and is reported to be an APL mine 
producer and user.  The loss of funding for Landmine Monitor will have a global 
impact, including in Latin America.  This highly regarded reference source is a 
useful tool in support of mine action as well as supporting achievement of political 
goals.  
• Support for the testing of demining equipment and development of European 
Standards for testing demining equipment, which in 2005-7 received 350,000 euros.  
Since the start of this funding there has been an alternative view that manufacturers 
of equipment should support the development of their own industry standards and it 
appears that EC funding for this purpose is unlikely to be continued.  This is also 
unlikely to have a large impact in Latin America, though it should be noted that new 
technology may be important in Colombia, and Chile is one of the first countries to 
adopt electronic information gathering for minefield survey. 
• Support for extending or revising IMAS, LIS priority setting and similar areas with 
application in many countries. 
• Support for multi-country initiatives where there is either no regional mechanism 
available (e.g. the countries are from different regions) or the regional mechanism 
has not identified a role in mine action and hence has not included it in a regional 
strategy paper.  This use of regional mechanisms in Latin America could have been 
advantageous. 
At least one further area will face some difficulties, which – although potentially open to a 
solution in the mid term - could be important for Colombia:   
 
• Support to organisations involving and committing non-state groups to abide by the 
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principles of the MBT, which in 2005-7 received 400,000 euros will now have to be 
geographically based. Given that many non-state actors (NSAs) who use mines are 
engaged in armed conflict with national governments, it is most unlikely that the 
respective governments would wish to see formal recognition of the NSAs in a CSP, 
which is now the route to funding.  Alternative funding routes have still to be 
developed, and may require careful use of regional initiatives if funding for such 
organisations as Geneva Call is to continue.  The horizontal budget line gave an 
opportunity to prioritise EC strategy over the Country Strategy.  The fragmentation 
of EC mine action (discussed below) acts against a single solution to this issue. 
FRAGMENTATION AND ISOLATION 
Key issues already identified in the 2005 Global review of EC Mine Action, as having a negative 
impact, are: wide dispersion (fragmentation) of funding and isolation of personnel resources 
working on planning and implementing projects; the increase in isolation due to deconcentration; 
and the difficulty in accessing technical support for improved contracting and monitoring.  With 
the possible exception of the dispersion of funding, these issues, at least in Latin America, are 
considered in this evaluation as having negative consequences for three of the standard five 
development evaluation criteria: efficacy, efficiency, and impact. 
 
As these two issues were identified as key issues for all aspects of the evaluation, and not just for 
the impact of the change to the new Instruments, they are discussed in detail below. 
Terminology 
In development terminology fragmentation has been used to describe the effect of recipients of 
development aid obtaining support from numerous donors.  The term proliferation has been used 
to describe the dispersion of aid by a donor to multiple recipients; the two concepts are in effect a 
mirror image of each other. The effect has been quantified by some researchers,29 and both 
fragmentation and proliferation have been found to have negative impacts.  Actions to mitigate 
have included Sector Wide Approaches, coordination groups, and a variety of other measures, but 
these have not generally been successful30. 
 
In this report fragmentation will be used in preference to the more usual proliferation to 
describe the effect of spreading the limited mine action resources of the EC thinly, as it is 
considered to be a more usefully descriptive.  Furthermore fragmentation in this report will be 
used to include all of the following: 
 
• Spreading limited resources thinly, so that several countries received small amounts 
of support during the period under evaluation. In Latin America, although the overall 
level of support was proportional to the overall mine problem, this resulted in just 
one mine action project in any country, except Colombia 
• The relative scale of mine action resources being very significantly smaller than 
other development aid budgets – for example, in Colombia mine action support 
formed less than 2% of the overall EuropeAid budget.  This means that there can 
never be a strong focus on mine action which has to be integrated as a small part of a 
larger portfolio.  
                                                    
29 Notably by Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima, and Moore in IDS Working Paper 214 “Aid proliferation: how responsible are 
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• The possibility that funding will be entirely project based so that repeat funding may 
not be available before the end of a previous project, leading to a loss of efficiency. 
 
A further concept will be used in this report, isolation.  This is a corollary to fragmentation.  
Most project officers responsible for mine action projects, and similarly the country or regional 
desk officers in Brussels, cannot be expected to have specialist mines knowledge, nor a large 
number of projects in mine action.  There are several aspects to isolation: 
 
• The limited number of projects covered by one delegation means that there is little or 
no accumulated knowledge and know-how 
• The small proportion of the workload means that staff cannot expend the significant 
time required to become proficient or expert in mine action. 
• There are at present only very limited co-ordination mechanisms to permit staff from 
different delegations to share knowledge and experiences in mine action. 
• The normal turnover of staff in Delegations means that it is likely that most projects 
will see a change of the project officer during the project duration, so the learning 
process will be repeated and know-how lost. 
 
Apart from Colombia, no Latin American EC delegation has had more than one mine action 
project.  So, any EC staff member dealing with mine action in Latin America had one project on 
the topic, or in Colombia, at most four projects at one time, which still comprise a small part of 
their responsibilities. There is no possibility of having mine action specialists in the delegations 
for this small workload.  Indeed, there is no justification from the present overall budget for even 
a single person for Latin America with specialist mines knowledge. In Brussels limited technical 
support is available through RELEX; there are two technical specialists in Directorate E (Unit 
E4: Governance, Security, Human Rights and Gender) to cover the whole area of disarmament 
and security but neither is specifically expert in mine action and development.  Technical support 
is thus limited. 
 
This also exacerbates the already existing problem of the difficulty of making use of specialist 
technical support, leading to poor strategic outcomes as well as poor project outcomes. 
While both deconcentration and the introduction of the new instruments has had a negative 
impact on the isolation of staff, it can be argued that the impact of the new instruments on 
fragmentation is mixed.  The loss of a focal point in Brussels has had a negative impact in terms 
of building a central knowledge base, and in areas of strategy development and support to non-
geographic priorities.  However, the horizontal mine action budget line led to the wide dispersion 
of a part of the overall budget for mine action; EC (geographic) and EU (bilateral and multilateral 
Member State) contributions to mine action have been considerably larger than the dedicated 
budget line.  It can thus be argued that the budget line contributed to the proliferation of small 
amounts of funding and thus to overall fragmentation. 
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CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE ENDING OF THE APL BUDGET LINE AND 
THE FOUR NEW INSTRUMENTS31 
The scale of the negative financial consequences of the loss of the APL budget line is modest 
when compared to the whole of EU support to mine action, and mine action is a very small part 
of the overall EC aid budget.  The "drastic simplification" (as stated in the proposal for the new 
instruments) that has been undertaken at EU level is a long term, large scale policy.  The potential 
gains from the changes which led to the introduction of the new Instruments and the ending of 
dedicated budget lines, in terms of overall efficiency for the EC (and the other European 
Institutions), are significant and the process of reform has been under way for several years.  The 
key issue now is to make the reforms work for Mine Action and to find ways of funding activities 
which are considered important but have been excluded.  A return to the previous situation of 
multiple, small horizontal budget lines, one of which is for Mine Action, is clearly not a 
possibility.  New ways of ensuring the future of mine action for example by using the mid-term 
revision of CSPs, to take place in about 18 months time, are the route forward. 
 
There was a lack of information in the mine action community prior to the changes, and no 
dialogue with the EC delegations in Latin America to ensure a smooth transition.  Even EC 
delegation staff appears to have been taken by surprise by the four new Instruments which had 
been published as a proposal some two years previously.  Improved communication within the 
EC would appear to be necessary.  If work with national governments and organisations had 
started earlier there would have been time to ensure that CSPs of some mine affected countries 
more adequately reflected the need for mine action.  There is a need to initiate coordination of 
experiences and opinions in time for the mid-term review of the CSPs and the first review of the 
new Instruments. 
 
However, there are serious concerns in a number of areas: 
 
• The loss of a financial instrument to support key actions (which involve very modest 
amounts of funding) in implementation and universalisation of the MBT and the 
Geneva Call deed of commitment.  There will potentially be a loss of visibility and 
influence for the EC well beyond the scale of the loss of funding. 
• The loss of a mechanism to fund a rapid (but not emergency) response.  However, 
this also affects sectors of considerably larger size and importance, such as post-
natural-disaster reconstruction which will have to be addressed quickly in Peru and 
Nicaragua.  However, without concerted action, once again mine action may miss the 
opportunity to influence the outcome to ensure that the needs of mine action are also 
fully considered. 
• The fragmentation of EC mine action in Latin America, and the isolation of staff 
responsible for projects, are, together, a contributing factor to the  extremely poor 
technical efficiency, and limited technical effectiveness and impact.  Strategic goals 
of improving regional harmony were far better achieved than technical goals; for 
example only a small percentage of very modest mine clearance goals were achieved 
in the large programmes in Chile and Peru/Ecuador.  Action needs to be taken to 
improve communication within the EC, to establish contact between the scattered 
mine action projects and the staff responsible for them in delegations, and to provide 
                                                    
31 The four new instruments are: Instrument for Stability, a financial Instrument for Development Co-operation and for 
Economic Co-operation (DCECI), a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and an Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA).  See pages 31 and 32 of this report for further information. 
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improved training or support.  Technical expertise is essential to improving strategic 
outcomes and a mechanism to introduce it needs to be found32.  This may not be easy 
within EC structures, but without it EC funding for mine action in Latin America 
risks being ineffective and poor value for money.  
 
On potential solution is a regional approach.  The most visible candidate for undertaking a 
regional role is the OAS AICMA programme, however, as has been discussed in detail in this 
report the non-developmental approach, the absence of a compatible management and planning 
structure, the exclusive inclusion of military and other government special police forces and 
above all the extremely poor value for money of the current programmes makes the OAS an 
unsuitable candidate.  Given the dominance of Colombia in the need for mine action, an 
alternative might be an internal EC coordination effort based on supporting the development of a 
regional role for the mine action staff of the EC delegation to Colombia. 
 
 The Global evaluation in 2005 made a number of recommendations regarding the selection of 
countries, selection of projects, and selection of implementers which have not been implemented.  
These recommendations were - and still are - highly pertinent to the current situation in Latin 
America. 
 
ANALYSIS - KEY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE EVALUATION 
FRAGMENTATION OF EC PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES 
Strategy Development 
The ending of the thematic Anti-personnel Landmine budget line has removed a clear focal point 
for developing a multi-annual mine action strategy.  It is understood that such a strategy will 
continue to be developed within RELEX.  However, there are some communication issues 
regarding both identifying who is responsible for what within RELEX, and especially between 
RELEX in Brussels and the Delegations.  Staff in EC delegations in Latin America, responsible 
for mine action projects, were not always well aware of who in Brussels would be able to provide 
further information on strategy or who was responsible for developing future strategy.  
 
Mine action is an area of considerable political sensitivity, and has a significantly higher political 
profile than many other development activities.  The European Parliament continues to show 
interest in the topic of mines and ERW: on 16 January 2006, reference was made to landmines in 
the European Parliament resolution on disability and development; on 23 May 2007 in the 
discussion on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects 
and basic choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy a reference to universalisation of 
the APMBC was proposed,33 and on 12 December 2007 passed a resolution calling for continued 
support for mine action,34 including the reinstatement of the horizontal budget line.   
 
There is a real risk that the future strategy could be clear on the political aspects, including 
developmental approaches, to the detriment of a sound technical foundation.  All three aspects 
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(political, developmental, and technical) are important in an overall strategy and it is far from 
clear that there is an adequate focus on the technical, nor the resources to support this aspect.  
There is already evidence in Latin America that the priorities selected in some countries (a) did 
not reflect a developmental approach to mine action and (b) the lack of technical expertise on the 
side of the EC has given extremely poor value for money.  
Delegation staff responsible for Project Selection and Implementation 
An initiative is urgently required to provide delegation staff with – at the very least - (a) a 
comprehensive set of briefing and reference documents so that they can retrieve essential 
information readily35 (b) strategy guidance (c) practical guidance on what can, and cannot be 
expected as an outcome of a mine action project.  There is a clear need for EC co-financed mine 
action projects throughout the region (and preferably throughout the world) to be based on 
common standards and learn from each others’ experience. Furthermore, in Latin America where 
the majority of mine contamination outside Colombia is on international borders, there is a clear 
need for closer communication and collaboration between delegations.  One example has been 
given in this report – the minefields on the Chilean side of the border with Peru that pose a 
problem for Peru but not Chile.  Regular (though not necessarily frequent) contact between all 
staff working on mine action projects in EC delegations in Latin America is a clear requirement.  
Even if such contact is no more than a regular conference phone call the impact could be 
significant both in information exchange and reduction of fragmentation.  All ERW contaminated 
countries in Latin America are Spanish-speaking (at least in the capital city), so there are no 
language barriers to improved communications. 
Contract issues – achieving impact and efficiency. 
EC delegation staff, who are development specialists with little or no experience of mine action 
and no specialist technical knowledge about demining, are negotiating project contracts with 
specialist staff of the OAS or UNDP who have detailed technical knowledge, considerable 
experience in the field and are representing (in the case of the OAS) a large and powerful 
organisation that has dominated mine action in Latin America for over ten years.  Staff who are 
specialists in one area of development, and in implementing development strategy and projects 
for the EC, are potentially at a significant technical disadvantage, and need to find ways to 
achieve outcomes which are “better” in the sense that they more closely reflect EC development 
policy, including LRRD, and which offer significantly increased value for money. 
 
EC staff does not have the time or supporting resources to be able to become fully informed 
about the technicalities of demining; increased access to core information would alleviate this.  
Identifying and using a mechanism to bring in even a small amount independent expert guidance 
at the contract preparation stage might offer significant benefits.  Use of mechanisms, which 
should already exist as part of a Project Cycle approach, to base future formulation and 
implementation on the results of monitoring and evaluation could also make a decisive 
contribution.   
 
The majority of projects in Latin America, which include mine clearance, have not reached the 
proposed targets of mines or square metres cleared – often by large margins.  The clearance 
organisations usually have a monopoly in their own country and generally suffer no loss from 
failing to meet the targets, indeed a common response has been to request more funding and 
extensions to the time period for clearance.  This creates a situation where there is little incentive 
                                                    
35This might include such information as available approaches and costs, examples of best practice, a detailed glossary 
and guidance on contractual issues specific to mine action. 
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to succeed. A remedy required may not be easy to achieve within the EC system.  The evaluation 
team understands that any recommendations have to be feasible within the context, and likely to 
succeed. 
• As noted above, improved information resources, possibly specialist training, and 
improved communications are required. 
• Improved contract drafting and enforcement are required.  Payment for clearance 
done rather than clearance planned is a clear example of a possible improvement.  As 
was noted in the 2005 Global Report, this will probably require input from technical 
specialists in the field to ensure that the contractual terms are optimal for the EC’s 
desired outcome.  It may also require willingness on the part of EC delegation staff to 
stand firm and insist on full compliance with contracts, including payment based on 
delivery of results, in an area where they are not specialists.  This is acknowledged to 
be a difficult situation to manage
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Table 8 – Matrix of country and Development outcomes for mine action interventions 
  Matrix of country and development outcomes for mine action interventions 
Country Type of project Cost Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Impact Sustainability Recommendation 
Chile Demining 
(including train & 
equip) 
1.0 M€ Political 
relevance 








Limited No mine action justification for 
repeating  




2.5 M € Good Medium so far- 
rapid survey 
not yet started 
Medium so far- 
rapid survey not 
yet started 
Medium so far Good  
Colombia  Emergency MRE 28 k € Good Not known Not known Not known Not known  
Colombia  Emergency MRE 1 k € Good Not known Not known Not known Not known  
Colombia Geneva Call - 
universalisation 
of MBT with 
NSAs 
250 k € 
(estimat
e) 
Good Good - but no 
breakthrough 
achieved 
Not known Medium Poor Potentially valuable to peace 
process, but not a priority for 
national government 
Colombia MRE 60 k € Good Not known Not known Not known Not known  
Colombia MRE and VA 675 k € Not yet known - 
started 2007 
Not yet  known 
- started 2007 
Not yet  known - 
started 2007 
Not yet  known - 
started 2007 
Not yet  known - 
started 2007 
 
Colombia  Victim 
Assistance 
800 K € Not yet  known - 
started 2007 
Not yet  known 
- started 2007 
Not yet  known - 
started 2007 
Not yet  known - 
started 2007 
Not yet  known - 
started 2007 
 
Colombia MRE and VA 525 k € Not yet  known - 
started 2007 
Not yet  known 
- started 2007 
Not yet  known - 
started 2007 
Not yet  known - 
started 2007 






(including train & 
equip) 










Poor No mine action justification 
but real value for peace 
process 
Nicaragua Demining 
(including train & 
equip) 
1.3 M€ Medium Medium  Poor Medium  Poor Limited results - was intended 
to finish clearance in country 






5 k € 
(estimat
e) 
Good Good Good High Good No mechanism to fund in new 
instruments - though worth 
more than small cost 
suggests 
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSIONS 
With the exception of Colombia which has a very severe problem due to mines, other ERW and 
also active ordnance, and Peru which has some impact due to mined infrastructure within the 
country, the impact and the casualties caused by mines and other ERW in Latin America is very 
limited.  Outside Colombia, mines have accounted for about one third of the casualties and other 
ERW about two thirds.  Due to ongoing armed conflict, Colombia has a very high rate of 
casualties with about 350 civilian and twice as many police and army mine and ERW victims 
each year. 
 
The allocation of 8 million euros, roughly 2% of the total of EC mine action funding, to Latin 
America in recent years is fully in line with the support from all donors who have allocated about 
3% of all funding to Latin America. 
 
The allocation to different countries of EC support for mine action in Latin America has 
generally been relevant and appropriate.  Nearly 60% of funding was for Colombia, by far the 
most affected country.  Political considerations as well as purely mine action criteria were 
included in (at least) the selection of Chile and the Peru/Ecuador border for clearance.  The two 
countries with the most severe problems, Peru and Colombia, included mine action in their 
Country Strategy Papers for 2002-6 and also 2007-13.  Ecuador, which was joint recipient of 
funding (with Peru) included mine action in its CSP for 2002-6. 
 
Given the current constraints in Colombia, selection of project topics (MRE, support for national 
mine action structures, victim assistance) for the EC funding is also considered as appropriate and 
relevant. 
 
Based on Resiliance-Impact analysis there is little or no case for further funding for mine action 
in Latin America on the basis of the direct impact of the actions, with two exceptions: Colombia, 
which has a very severe problem, and Peru which has a limited problem inside the country with 
mined infrastructure.  In Colombia the ongoing conflict, and the army monopoly on demining, 36 
limit options.  The EC funding for a rapid survey of mine impact and victims (currently in 
planning) is welcomed.  Until a peace process is underway there may be limited opportunities for 
further action. 
 
It is understood that the EC may choose to support mine clearance or other mine actions as part 
of a larger political process (e.g. in support of consolidation of the peace agreement between Peru 
and Ecuador).  The resulting projects should be designed to optimise the political impact first, 
and the mine action impact second. 
 
Mine clearance throughout Latin America is a monopoly of military and police and civil 
protection special forces, there appears to be no NGO or commercial clearance.  The 
Organization of American States’ mine action programme dominates mine action both in terms of 
scale of its operations, and also historically.  The OAS modus operandi is based on military-to-
military training to build national clearance capacity in each country.  There is also some limited 
                                                    
36 A year after this report was written the Colombian authorities announced their intention to work with international 
civilian demining organisations. 
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funding for MRE, victim assistance and other aspects.  The result has been too much of a “one 
size fits all” approach that has not given optimal results for donors such as the EC.  The demining 
activities have been characterised by an over-emphasis on training and equipping new demining 
units in countries with only modest contamination, where a focus on clearance could have been 
more appropriate.  There are also some issues regarding how the humanitarian demining within 
military structures relates to a Project Cycle and developmental approach.   
 
The 2006 changes which, inter alia, ended the mine action thematic budget line and created the 
four new Instruments for cooperation, may have an impact on EC mine action in Latin America.  
They present both challenges and also some opportunities.  There was poor communication 
between those parts of the EC working on the new Instruments and (a) other EC staff, especially 
in the delegations and (b) with the mine action community.  There appears to have been little or 
no concerted response by the mine action community to the draft proposals published in 2004.   
 
The financial impact of the new instruments is likely to be modest and short to medium term in 
for mine action in Latin America with only a few exceptions:  (i) the lack of a “rapid response” 
mechanism will have a negative impact, especially on having a mine action plan in place to 
support any movement towards peace in Colombia.  This lack of a rapid response provision will 
also affect other, much larger, actions, notably natural disaster recovery in Peru and Nicaragua.  
(ii) A regional mechanism, or other alternative, will have to be identified for support to the 
Geneva Call process if they are to play a role in bringing non-state actors in Colombia to abandon 
their continuing use of APLs. 
 
Fragmentation of resources and activities and the associated isolation of staff, was identified as 
the most important challenge to EC mine action in Latin America.  This issue was previously 
noted in the 2005 Global report, but does not appear to have received attention as a result of that 
report.  Given that there is little or no need to continue mine action projects in Latin America, 
with the exception of Colombia, addressing this issue is unlikely to have an impact at regional 
level.  However, there may be a “lesson learned” with value for EC mine action projects and 
programmes in other parts of the world. 
 
The serious problems due to the overall fragmentation of EC mine action and isolation of EC 
staff responsible for projects have been exacerbated by deconcentration, and the recent wide 
ranging changes.  In terms of the dispersion of funding the impact of ending the horizontal budget 
line is likely to be small but positive. 
 
EC staff cannot be experts in demining when they have only one, or a few, mine action projects 
as part of a large portfolio.  This has led to poor project design and implementation.  EC staff 
simply cannot afford the time needed to become expert so they are limited in their options.  
 
There is a serious lack of information in a suitable format to support delegation staff by providing 
them the key information they need to successfully draw up and implement demining contracts 
and manage mine action projects.  The lack of information is exacerbated by the apparent severe 
difficulty in contracting technical experts to assist in these tasks (also a key point of the 2005 
Global Assessment) and the absence of opportunities for specialist training. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The issue of fragmentation of EC mine action, and the isolation of EC staff responsible for 
projects, should be addressed.   
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(i) In the event that there is further funding for mine action in Latin America, 
contact and communication between EC staff in different delegations who are 
responsible for mine action projects or programmes, needs to be substantially 
improved as a matter of urgency.  Sharing experience and best practice, and 
reducing isolation, are necessary to improve the impact of EC co-financed 
projects. 
(ii) Information resources for EC staff in different delegations who are responsible 
for mine action projects or programmes, need to be very substantially improved 
as a matter of urgency.  A comprehensive set of reference documents should be 
made available. 
(iii) The difficulty of employing specialist technical expertise in support of EC staff 
continues to create a situation where proposals and contracts are not subjected to 
sufficient technical scrutiny.  This is not a new issue but remains one that 
requires urgent action. 
(iv) If further mine clearance projects are to be supported, a way to interface between 
the EC Project Cycle Management and Log Frames, and the military planning of 
the clearance organisations currently active in Latin America, must be found and 
implemented. 
 
Future funding for mine action in Latin America should be based on a clear socio-economic 
benefit, or a clear political benefit such as peace-building, or both.  A clear benefit on one area 
should not preclude the other and the optimum route is to achieve impact in both.   
 
Any future EC investment in mine action in Latin America must take steps to conduct an 
appraisal to determine the appropriate program model and to ensure value for money of the 
proposed intervention.  Such an appraisal obviously requires technical expertise as well as other 
specialist knowledge.  In practice it seems that finding a way to contract such technical expertise 
within EC structures may be a substantial obstacle to such an approach. In some cases there may 
be a case for a new intervention mechanism: for example the OAS could manage a clearance 
contract on behalf of the EC where the implementer was chosen by a competitive bidding 
process.  The long established presence and experience of the OAS AICMA programme should 
not be a barrier to the EC insisting on a development based approach, use of Project Cycle 
Management, and above all, value for money. 
 
Attention should be given to supporting moves to persuade non-state actors in Colombia who 
continue to use anti-personnel landmines on a large scale, to change their position.  This is one of 
very few countries with continued large scale use of AP mines.  A pro-active approach to 
identifying new ways of funding such organisations as Geneva Call in this work should be 
undertaken, even though this raises difficult questions for the relationship with the government of 
Colombia.  There are some practical difficulties as to how to fund such work within the new 
instruments. 
 
Given the continuing conflict in Colombia, mine action in support of the EC’s substantial 
commitment to peace-building and emergency relief to displaced people in Colombia should 
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APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE 




In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the 
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).37 These (referred to 
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused 
policy.  
 
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: The Commission shall regularly assess 
operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the 
operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future 
operations. 
 
The APL Regulation goes on to state: Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, 
the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community 
mine actions… (Article 14) 
 
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-200738 further 
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the 
results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment. 
 
To implement these provisions, the EC: 
 
1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-
2004; 
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons 
learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:39 
 
• Africa • Caucasus-Central Asia • Latin America 
• Asia-Pacific • Europe • Middle East 
 
The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,40 while the agreement with 
                                                    
37 Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning 
action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation 
(EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against 
anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The 
provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001. 
38 This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC 
Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.  
39 Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to: 
• provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations and 
similar studies; 
• train people from mine affected countries in evaluation; 
• support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating 
to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). 
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the GICHD was concluded in December that year.  
 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION 
The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives 
and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, 
programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the 
Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the 
Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country 
level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual 
projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.  
 
Overall objective:  
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Latin America to 
generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to 
improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, 
and policies. 
 
Specific objectives:  
− To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis: 
o the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 
2005-2007; 
o national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities; 
o EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected 
countries in Latin America 2002-2006; 
o EC strategy documents for Latin America or major sub-regions in Latin America. 
− To analyse the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in Latin America, and 
across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.); 
− To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in: 
o addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries 
o fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities; 
o supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the 
beneficiary countries;  
o supporting local mine action organisations; 
− To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a 
country (national; UN; OAS, donors; international NGOs; etc.); 
− To assess the role & performance of multilateral agencies active in the national mine action 
programme (e.g. Inter-American Defence Board/OAS, UN agencies, etc.); 
− To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine 
action in Latin America, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for 
mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects; 
− To assess the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of 
implementation; 
− To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance 
(including plans for sustainability); 
− To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian 
assistance, development, and armed violence reduction 
                                                                                                                                                           
40 Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004. 
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− To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and 
the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the EC 
to Latin America; 
− To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of EC-
funded mine projects; 
− To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among 
mine action programmes in Latin America and globally. 
 
Expected results 
The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to Latin America, and to 
particular mine-affected countries in Latin America, since 2002. It shall incorporate more 
detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to 
illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will aim 
in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to 
mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other 
donors, and UN agencies for the next years.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work: 
 
− Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway) 
 
− Desk Research 
 




− Analysis and Reporting 
 
Country Missions 
As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team 
members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and 
collect documents and data from: 
 
• EC delegations 
• national authorities and officials from national mine action centres 
• UN agencies supporting mine action 
• representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country 
• representatives from mine action operators (local and international) 
• other key government officials  
• representatives from key regional organisation (where present).  
 
Additional data collection 
Additional information will be obtained from: 
  
                                                    
41 Relating to the cross-border project Mine Action in the Condor Mountain Range of Peru/ Ecuador, approved in 2005. 
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− Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as 
well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available; 
− Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);  
− Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project 
managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC 
Delegations, managers of operator organisations, both in organisations’ headquarters and on 
the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.). 
− EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes. 
− National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action 
Strategies from the focus countries 
− Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine 
action) and the World Bank 
− Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies 
− Other sources, as appropriate. 
 
4. OUTPUTS 
An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning and 
data collection stage (late October 2007). 
 
A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other 
stakeholders at the end of each country mission. 
 
Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and 
distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to 
other stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks. 
 
A final report will be submitted to the GICHD and EC Brussels. 
 
All reports will be in English, with the final Executive Summary translated into Spanish as well. 
 
All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the 
European Union and managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD). The reports should display the logos of both the EU and the GICHD.42 
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Country Contract Title Contractor’s 
signature date  
or start date 
of activities 
End date of 
activities 






Nicaragua Mine Action activities in Nueva 
Segovia 
29/04/2003 29/04/2006 Organization of 
American States 






Engaging armed non-state actors 
(NSAs) in a landmine ban: 
Colombia and the Middle East 
02/12/2003 01/12/2005 Geneva Call 250.000 € Total budget was 500.000 € - assumed 




Worldwide International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines: activities proposal 1-
9-04 to 30-9-05 including 
Landmine Monitor Initiative 
01/09/2004 30/09/2005 International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines Asbl 
5.000 € Total budget was 500.000€.  Very difficult 
to identify the small part relevant to Latin 






Mine Action in the Condor 
Mountain Range of Peru/Ecuador 
01/01/2005 01/04/2006 Organization of 
American States 
1.000.000 €  
DDH/2004/097-
944 
Colombia  MRE “Estrategia de Comunicación 
para la prevención de accidentes 
por minas antipersonales y 
artefactos explosivos abandonados 
con y para niños, niñas y jóvenes" 
01/02/2005 01/02/2006 Fundacion Antonio 
Restrepo Barco 
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Country Contract Title Contractor’s 
signature date  
or start date 
of activities 
End date of 
activities 






Colombia  Institutional Strengthening of the 
Colombian National Mines Action 
Capacity 
01/01/2006 26/12/2010 Departamento 
Administrativo 
Presidencia de la 
Republica, Programa 
Presidencial de Acción 
Integral contra las Minas 
Antipersonal DAPR-
PPAICMA 
2.500.000 €  
MAP/2005/108-
985 
Chile Mine Clearance “Desminado 
Humanitario en Chile” 




Colombia  Our future is today III: Re-
integration in the educational 
system and increased protection 
against mines and UXO’s 
01/03/2006 Feb 07 Diakonisches Werk der 
EKD - Diakonie 
Katastrophenhilfe 
Germany  682.000 € 
total of which 28.113 € 
for Mine Action   
28.113 € Reported as 100.580 in EC “Mine Action 
in the World” report. 
ECHO/SM/BUD/
2006/01016 
Colombia  Access and Humanitarian Aid for 
populations putting up resistance, 
those that have returned and those 
displaced, in the municipalities 
most affected by the conflict and 
the displacement in the 
departments of Valle del Cauca 
and Nariño. 
01/07/2006 Jun 07 Solidaridad 
Internacional  600.000 € 
total of which 1001 € for 
Mine Action 
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Country Contract Title Contractor’s 
signature date  
or start date 
of activities 
End date of 
activities 






Colombia  MRE “Educación en el riesgo 
(ERM) de la población vulnerable 
y Atención a las víctimas de minas 
antipersonal y municiones sin 
explotar en el sur de Colombia” 
01/10/2007  Deutscher 
Caritasverband e.V. 
(Caritas Germany) 
675.000 €  
MAP/2007/143-
269 
Colombia  VA “Asistencia a víctimas civiles 
de accidentes de Minas 
Antipersonal y Municiones Sin 
Explotar (MAP y MUSE) en 
Colombia” 
01/12/2007  HI Belgium 800.000 €  
MAP/2007/144-
541 
Colombia  MRE in Antioquía 
“Institucionalización y 
sostenibilidad de la educación 
riesgo de minas y la atención 
biopsicosocial a víctimas de MAP 
y MUSE, a través de educadores y 
personal de salud en municipios 
prioritarios del Departamento de 
Antioquia” 
01/12/2007  Antioquía Local 
Government 
525.000 €  
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Country Contract Title Start date End date of 
activities 









To provide protection, relief and 
assistance to people affected by the 
internal conflict in Colombia in the 
rural and urban areas located close 
to the border with Venezuela, in 
the Cesar departments. 
Apr.07 Feb.08 Movimiento por la Paz 
el Desarme y la Libertad 
(MPDL) 
 Multisectorial project with a mine risk 
education component (under R6): 
Workshops on antipersonnel mines and 
UXO for IDP families and tranings of 







ICRC assistance and protection 
activities 
Feb.07 Jan.08 International Committee 
of the Red Cross 
 The component of economic support for 
residents (R3) contains provision of food 
assistance up to three months and EHI on 
a one-time basis for 100 families of the 






Amélioration de l’attention 
médicale portée aux populations 
vulnérables d’Arauquita, dont en 
particulier, celle du service de 
santé publique. 
Jul.07 Jun.08 Croix-Rouge Française  The project focused at providing health 
assistance has also a component of mine 
risk education and awareness (R2): 
Formation de leaders communautaires 
dans chaque point d’attention sur la 
thématique des mines durant 3 jours, avec 
distribution du matériel didactique. 
Réalisation de 10 ateliers sur les mines 
pour les populations infantiles et adultes 
avec une distribution de matériel 
didactique 
 EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROJECTS (ECHO) STARTING IN 2007 IN COLOMBIA WITH IDENTIFIED COMPONENTS OF MRE AND 
OTHER MINE ACTION.  NO SEPARATE FINANCIAL DATA FOR THE MINE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE GENERALLY IN SUPPPORT OF 
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Country Contract Title Start date End date of 
activities 









Humanitarian assistance to isolated 
or blocked rural communities, 
populations at risk of displacement 
and other population directly 
affected by the armed conflict in 
the Municipalities of Remedios 
and Zaragoza, Department of 
Antioquia, Colombia.  
Jul.07 Jun.08 Spanish Red Cross  This project focused on providing health 
assistance has also a component of mine 
risk education and awareness (R2): talks 
on antipersonnel mines  for children and 







Access and humanitarian aid for 
populations putting up resistance, 
those that have returned and are 
displaced, in the territories of 
ethnic communities most affected 
by the armed conflict in Valle del 
Cauca and Nariño 
Jul.07 Jun.08 Solidaridad 
Internacional 
 Multisectorial project with a component of 
institutional and community strenghtening 
(R1 and R5) that will contain specific 
activities (to be defined by the indigenous 
communities in the next weeks) such as 
sensitation events regarding risk related 
with landmines and/or development of 
contingency plans in case of landmine 






Our future is today: Protection of 
Indigenous Populations and 
Children 
Mär.07 Feb.08 Diakonisches Werk der 









Provision of coordination services 
for humanitarian response in 
Colombia 




 Among its coordination and information 
activities, OCHA also collects and 
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Country Contract Title Start date End date of 
activities 









Improving humanitarian protection 
of communities living in the midst 
of the conflict. 
Okt.07 Jun.08 OXFAM GB  Multisectorial project with a capacity 
strengthening component that contains 
actions to improve the information and 
communication relating to the routes for 
treatment of populations affected by 
landmines, among others (R2)*.  
 
 
 
 
